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STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED 
The issue presented in appellant's Appeal is whether there 
is sufficient evidence to support the Court's finding that the 
plaintiffs were employed by the defendant, and that the 
agreements signed by the defendant are binding. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Respondents concur in the comments made in appellant's Brief 
under the headings "Statement and Nature of the Case" and 
"Disposition in the Lower Court". However, additional facts are 
presented herewith to give the Court a clearer picture of the 
evidence which the trial court relied upon in making its 
findings and entering judgment against the appellant. 
When Karen Edwards began working for Larry Groover in 1980, 
she was initially paid by an entity known as Groover Financial 
Management. She was not aware of the structure of this business 
entity (Record 75-76). When she was hired, Larry Groover told 
Karen that the bonuses she would earn would be more than her 
salary (R. 75). In late 1981 or early 1982 Groover promised 
Edwards, among others, that four of them would divide equally ten 
percent (10%) of the renewals that Groover personally.received 
from the insurance policies he wrote with A. L. Williams (R. 77-
78). However, such bonuses were never paid (R. 79). 
In furtherance of the initial promises made to Karen 
Edwards at the time of her hiring, in December of 1980 Groover's 
employees received a written promise that they would receive 
bonuses, the source of which would be a percentage of Groover's 
renewals (R. 87, Plaintiff's Exhibit 6). The defendant signed 
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this document (R. 87, 245). Again in late 1982 or early 1983, 
the defendant again promised certain employees, including 
Karen Edwards and Judy Smith, ten percent (10%) of the profits of 
an entity known as Golden Tiger Energy as bonuses for the 
employees1 work (R. 79). Karen Edwards relied on these promises 
(R. 80), and the defendant admits that his employees relied on 
his promises (R. 255-256). 
Karen Edwards and Judy Smith became dissatisfied with the 
working conditions and the unkept promises and in 1983 Karen 
Edwards approached Groover, seeking to terminate her employment 
and to compromise her claims for promised but unpaid bonuses. 
Accordingly, she had a conversation with the defendant wherein 
the parties reached an agreement on a compromise of Karen's claim 
(R. 89-90, Plaintiff's Exhibit 5, which is included in 
Appellant's Brief as Addendum Exhibit "B"). During this 
conversation the parties negotiated a figure of $7,500 in cash to 
be paid to plaintiff (R. 92). Mr. Groover admitted that this 
figure was fairly negotiated (R. 180). One of the terms of each 
of the agreements was that Smith and Edwards would each receive a 
specified amount of cash to later purchase stock in an entity 
known as San Saba Energy (Plaintiff's Exhibits 5 and 8). Both 
Edwards and Smith testified that they had been told by Groover 
that the stock would be released shortly and that it was "never 
an if, it was just a when" (R. 90-91, R. 164). Karen Edwards 
testified that had she known that San Saba's stock might not have 
been issued, she would have insisted upon cash in the full amount 
(R. 91-92). 
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Karen Edwards received $2,500 cash from the defendant 
and Judy Smith received $1,000 from the defendant as specified 
in their respective agreements (R. 93, R. 165). 
Karen Edwards and Judy Smith assigned their claims to 
Porter & Bettridge, a bonded collection agency, who brought this 
action to collect on the unpaid agreements. 
Although appellant cites his own testimony to the contrary, 
Karen Edwards testified that everyone who worked in the office, 
including herself and the employees of Managed Accounting 
Services, took orders from Larry Groover (R. 82). Further, Judy 
Smith testified that she always considered herself an employee of 
Larry Groover (R. 153). 
During the three years of her employment with the 
defendant, Karen Edwards worked for several entities other than 
the one she was initially hired for, and all entities were 
directed by Larry Groover personally (R. 80-82). During this 
period of time Karen Edwards and Judy Smith received paychecks 
from several different entities on any given pay day (R. 83, 
153). In fact, on February 4, 1982 Karen Edwards received her 
semi-monthly salary in the form of checks from six different 
entities (R. 83-84, Plaintiff's Exhibit 7). Larry Groover was 
directly responsible for this piece-meal approach to the wage 
payments (R. 85). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Respondents submit that there is sufficient and substantial 
evidence upon which the Court based its ruling. Specifically, 
Edwards and Smith presented evidence that Groover hired them 
personally, benefitted personally from their work, and paid each 
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of them from a variety of corporate entities during the course of 
their employment. This evidence supports the trial court's 
finding that Groover is personally liable on the subject 
agreements. 
Edwards and Smith also presented evidence that supported 
the trial court's finding that the agreements signed by the 
defendant were in settlement and an accord and satisfaction of 
the potential claim of these employees for unpaid bonuses that 
were promised by Groover and relied upon by the employees, but 
were never made. 
Finally, there was ample evidence to support the trial 
court's finding that there was no condition precedent existing in 
the subject agreements that would justify further non-payment 
under the terms of the agreement. 
I. STANDARD OF REVIEW 
This Court has stated: 
[o]n appeal we apply the traditional rules of review: 
we assume that the trial court believed those aspects 
of the evidence which may be deemed to support his 
finding and judgment; and we survey the evidence in 
the light favorable thereto. 
Tates, Inc. v. Little America Refining Co., 535 P.2d 1228, at 1229 
(Utah 1975). In addition, the standard of review in determining 
whether the subject contracts included conditions precedent is: 
to review the evidence and all inferences that may be 
drawn therefrom in a light most supportative of the 
findings of the crier of fact. The findings and 
judgment of the trial court will not be disturbed when 
they are based on substantial, competent, admissible 
evidence. 
Kimball v. Campbell, 699 P.2d 714, 716 (Utah 1985) (quoting Car 
Doctor. Inc. v. Belmont, 635 P.2d 82, 83-4 (Utah 1981). 
7 
II. THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY HELD THAT AN 
ACCORD AND SATISFACTION WAS CREATED. 
This action arose out of a dispute between the appellant 
employer and two of his employees as to certain bonuses that had 
been promised to the employees. One of the sources of these 
bonuses were Mr. Groover's personal funds. 
As the evidence recited above clearly shows, during the 
years that Karen Edwards and Judy Smith worked for the defendant 
they never received any of the promised bonuses from A. L. 
Williams overrides, which went directly and personally to Mr. 
Groover, or Golden Tiger/San Saba. Disappointed and determined 
to leave Groover's employ, Edwards and Smith, individually and 
separately, met with Groover to discuss the value of the 
undelivered, but promised, bonuses. The employees desired an 
immediate payment of cash but Groover would not agree to it. 
Instead, an upfront partial payment of cash was made and an 
agreement was made that a subsequent payment of cash would be 
made at a later date. The employees each drew up a typed 
agreement indicating the remaining amount of cash owed them and 
included the promissory condition that they would purchase stock 
in San Saba upon receipt of the cash. All parties to the 
agreements signed them. Each of these agreements became an 
accord. 
Accord and satisfaction arises where the parties to 
an agreement resolve that a given performance by one 
party thereto, offered in substitution of the 
performance originally agreed upon, will discharge the 
obligation created under the original agreement. 
8 
Bennion v. LeGrand Johnson Construction_co_r 701 P.2d 1078, 1082 
(Utah 1985); Lawrence Construction Co. v. Holmquist, 642 P.2d 
382, 384 (Utah 1982); Sugarhouse Finance Co. v. Anderson, 610 
P.2d 1369, 1372 (Utah 1980). This Court, in Sugarhouse Finance, 
further outlined the essential elements of an accord and 
satisfaction as: " ( D a proper subject matter; (2) competent 
parties; (3) an assent or meeting of the minds of the parties; 
and (4) a consideration given for the accord." Sugarhouse 
Finance, 610 P.2d at 1372. 
Although an oral agreement as to the bonuses already 
existed, there had been no performance on the part of Groover. 
Upon Groover's Motion to Dismiss during trial, the trial court 
found that the plaintiff's evidence created a cause of action 
against Groover (R. 273-274, attached as Addendum Exhibit "A" 
herein). Such a cause of action is the proper subject matter for 
an accord and satisfaction. Whether the cause of action had 
merit or not is not known nor is it important for "it is not 
necessary for the dispute to be well-founded, so long as it is in 
good faith." Golden Key Realty, Inc. v. Mantas, 699 P.2d 730 
(Utah 1985) (citing Ashton v. Skeen, 85 Utah 489, 39 P.2d 1073, 
1076 (1935)). All of the parties agreed that the employees had 
not been paid what they were worth and that the bonuses were 
established to make up for that (R. 75, R. 306-307). 
As to the second element required to establish an accord 
and satisfaction, there has been no argument by Groover that any 
of the parties were other than competent nor is there any 
evidence that such is the case. 
The third element required is an assent by the parties. 
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Such assent is established by the parties1 signatures to the 
agreements, introduced as Plaintiff's Exhibits 5 and 8. Edwards 
and Smith were the parties who memorialized on paper the verbal 
understanding and agreement that each of them had with the 
defendant. Groover, an attorney-at-law (R. 249), read, 
understood, and signed the documents. Although Groover's 
testimony is self-serving on the issue of an alleged condition 
precedent, it does further establish that the terms of the 
agreements were negotiated (R. 248, 252). 
The fourth essential element is legal consideration. The 
doctrine of accord and satisfaction requires that there be an 
actual dispute or disagreement over the amount due and that the 
parties enter into an agreement that one party will pay, and the 
other party will accept, a certain amount as a compromise of 
their differences and in satisfaction of claimed amount. Tates, 
535 P.2d 1229-30. This Court has established that when a bona 
fide dispute is settled as to an unliquidated or disputed amount 
owed, such settlement constitutes valid legal consideration. 
E.g., Golden Key Realty, 699 P.2d, at 733; Cannon v. 
Stevens School of Business, Inc., 560 P.2d 1383, 1386 (Utah 1977). 
As additional consideration, Edwards and Smith gave up the 
cause of action that each of them had against the defendant based 
upon promissory estoppel, although neither was aware of the legal 
term for it (e.g., R. 89-90). After a fashion, Mr. Groover 
testified that he voluntarily promised certain bonuses to these 
employees and that they relied on those promises (R. 255-256). 
There can be no doubt that Groover intended that his employees 
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rely upon his representations since he made them at the time he 
hired them and at subsequent intervals when the question of 
raises and compensation would arise. He was attempting to obtain 
their loyalty, labor and skills at a greatly reduced salary and 
hoped that the representations made would elicit such an outcome. 
For a time, it did. Karen Edwards1 testimony confirmed that the 
employees relied upon Mr. Groover's promises (R. 80). As a 
result, they detrimentally relied upon his representations and 
remained in his employ at a substantially inadequate salary. 
Such a detrimental reliance became a good faith claim which the 
employees gave up at the time of the accord with the defendant. 
These elements of an accord and satisfaction were clearly 
and sufficiently established in the trial court. The trial court 
found that the employees each entered into a "settlement 
agreement" with Groover, which obligated him, personally and 
individually, to pay the amounts stated on the agreements. 
(Findings of Fact, R. 44-46). 
Because the trial court found that an accord and 
satisfaction had occurred, the Court rejected Groover's testimony 
(R. 186) that the bonuses and promises to pay were gifts. A gift 
is defined as "a voluntary transfer of property to another made 
gratuitously and without consideration." Black's Law Dictionary 
619 (rev. 5th ed. 1979). The trial court found that there had 
been consideration given for the agreements (R. 186). Therefore 
they could not have been a gift from the defendant. 
III. THE PLAINTIFFS WERE HIRED AND WORKED FOR 
THE DEFENDANT. 
The employees testified that they were interviewed and 
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hired by Groover. (R. 75-76, R. 149). Edwards and Smith 
received their paychecks from any of seven different corporations 
or entities which were directed and controlled by Groover. The 
testimony and evidence establish that Mr. Groover personally 
hired the plaintiffs. It was further established that Mr. 
Groover, individually and personally, signed the agreements with 
Karen Edwards and Judy Smith. There is not indication that he 
was acting in a corporate capacity. Nor is it insignificant that 
Mr. Groover was not a corporate officer of some of the 
corporations which paid the plaintiffs. Testimony established 
that regardless of the position he held in the company, Mr. 
Groover was in charge of the entities for which the plaintiffs 
worked (R. 80-82). 
IV. THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY FOUND THAT THE 
ISSUANCE OF THE SAN SABA STOCK WAS NOT A 
CONDITION PRECEDENT. 
Groover asserts that the agreements drawn up by Edwards and 
Smith and signed by the parties contained a condition precedent; 
that the subsequent payment of $5,000 to Karen and $1,000 to Judy 
was conditioned upon San Saba stock "going public". However, 
neither agreement, expressly or impliedly, stated anything about 
the "going public" of San Saba stock nor was there any evidence 
that the agreement was based upon that condition. It is well 
established that a condition precedent "must appear expressly or 
by clear implication." Cheever v. Schramm, 577 P.2d 951, 953 
(Utah 1978). There is no argument from the employees that a 
promissory condition existed as to the San Saba stock, i,e., that 
Edwards and Smith would purchase the stock at the time they were 
given the cash. That is exactly what their understanding was 
12 
when they memorialized the agreement on paper. They wanted to 
purchase the stock because Groover had convinced them that by 
investing in the stock they would be able to increase the value 
of the stock by a hundred fold and that it would be a valuable 
investment (R. 164). There was never any conversation between 
Groover and Edwards or Smith about the possibility of the San 
Saba stock not "going public" (R. 90-91, R. 164). The employees 
included the promissory condition of purchasing the stock with 
the cash paid by Groover so that they would in fact be able to 
acquire it at the later date. "A simple statement or stipulation 
in a contract is not necessarily a condition to a party's duty to 
performance." Id., What is controlling is the "parties1 
intent, which is derived from 'a fair and reasonable construction 
of the language used in light of all circumstances when [the 
parties] executed the contract1." Kimball, 699 P.2d at 716, 
(quoting Creer v. Thurman, 581 P.2d 149, 151 (Utah 1978)). 
Edward's agreement with Groover stated "[t]he 5,000 
is to be paid in cash with the means to purchase the stock on a 
resubscription agreement, expected to take place approximately 1 
June 1983" (Plaintiff's Exhibit 5). There is no indication other 
than from Groover that Karen was inferring that the payment of 
the $5,000 was conditioned on the going public of the San Saba 
stock. Rather, she agreed to purchase the San Saba stock upon 
receipt of the $5,000. 
Smith's agreement with the defendant stated "I [Larry 
Groover] will give $[1],000 cash to Judy Smith to purchase San 
Saba stock, per our employment termination settlement of April 
13 
28, 1983" (Plaintiff's Exhibit 8). Again, there is no indication 
that the payment to Judy was predicated upon the going public of 
the San Saba stock. As a result, the trial court found that the 
issuance of the San Saba stock was not a condition precedent to 
the obligation to pay (Findings of Fact, R. 44-46). 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons stated above, there was substantial, 
competent, believable evidence admitted at trial supporting the 
trial court's findings and this Court should affirm the trial 
court's decision, dismiss Groover's appeal and award respondent's 
their costs. 
Further, respondants believe that Groover's appeal is 
patently frivolous and respondants should be awarded just 
damages, including attorney's fees, pursuant to Rule 33, Utah 
Rules of Appellate Procedure. 
RESPECTFULLY submitted this * day of June, 1986. 
HENRIKSEN, HENRIKSEN & CALL, P.C. 
Attorney for Respondents 
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to claim that they did not know that a future event j 
t happen, is beyond reason. It goes along with 
the question I asked, whether or not they considered Mr. 
Groover a prophet to foretell the future. I believe that 
the Court can take judicial notice of the fact that there 
are very few people who claim to have the ability to foreteli 








tell what the S.E.C. can do, and that type of 
ion. And I don't think Mr. Groover ever claimed 
that power when he was negotiating with these indi- i 
The event is a future event. That's clear from 
of the contract. They didn't need to be told that 
event might not happen by the mere fact that it's 
event. That in and of itself is enough to give 
any rational person knowledge that there's a contingency 
and the 
from the 
thing might not occur. 
THE COURT: Thank you. 
Well, on the issue of consideration, I think 
evidence presented so far, at least if I believe 
the testimony of the Plaintiffs, there was consideration. 




think it's a question of past consideration, because 
what they were giving up is something they had right 
ich was sort of a cause of action for past compen-





 prevailed. They settle cases all the time that don't 
2 have any merit. I think at least they felt they had some-
3
 J thing coming in bonuses that they had been promised. That 
at that point Mr. Groover would have said well, I'm not 
5 | going to pay you a dime. Forget it. I think they probably 
may have had a cause of action at that point or at least 
7
 j would have pursued it in some way or had an opportunity 
8 I to. And I think that's what they gave up in return for 
9 I their agreement. 
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 So I think there was consideration. At least, 
11 | if I believe their version of the transaction, 
And in terms of the condition precedent, I don't 
13| think it's all that clear. But as I read these things from 
the testimony presented, again, if I believe what they say, 
I don't think that this company going public was considered 
to be a condition precedent. They were going to get the 
money, and they had the further opportunity to buy the San 
Saba Stock. They give the money to the Defendant, that 
opportunity, and I think as I read the statute, they would 
have been entitled to the case in any event. So I'm going 











 I H a n n a . 
23
 I MR. HANNA: Thank you, Your Honor 
24 
25 
THE COURT: Do you want to call your first 
witness? 
?0fi 
